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THE VALUE OF THE COPYRIGHT CLAUSE IN
CONSTRUCTION OF COPYRIGHT LAW*
By THoMAs BOGGS RICHARDS**
The present law in the United States governing copyright is essen-
tialy that enacted when Congress consolidated all federal copyright
statutes in 1909.1 Largely because of unanticipated developments, 2
* This note was originally written as a paper for the 1974 Nathan Burkan Mem-
orial Competition sponsored by the American Society of Composers, Authors, and Pub-
lishers.
** Member, Third-Year Class, School of Law, University of California at Davis.
1. The 1909 Act provides: "Any person entitled thereto, upon complying with
the provisions of this title, shall have the exclusive right:
(a) To print, reprint, publish, copy, and vend the copyrighted work;
(b) To translate the copyrighted work into other languages or dialects, or make any
other version thereof, if it be a literary work; to dramatize it if it be a nondramatic
work; to convert it into a novel or other nondramatic work if it be a drama; to arrange
or adapt it if it be a musical work; to complete, execute, and finish it if it be a model
or design for a work of art;
(c) To deliver, authorize the delivery of, read, or present the copyrighted work in pub-
lic for profit if it be a lecture, sermon, address or similar production, or other nondrama-
tic literary work; to make or procure the making of any transcription or record thereof
by or from which, in whole or in part, it may in any manner or by any method be ex-
hibited, delivered, presented, produced, or reproduced; and to play or perform it in public
for profit, and to exhibit, represent, produce, or reproduce it in any manner or by any
method whatsoever....
(d) To perform or represent the copyrighted work publicly if it be a drama or, if it
be a dramatic work and not reproduced in copies for sale, to vend any manuscript or
any record whatsoever thereof; to make or to procure the making of any transcription
or record thereof by or from which, in whole or in part, it may in any manner or by
any method be exhibited, performed, represented, produced, or reproduced; and to ex-
hibit, perform, represent, produce, or reproduce it in any manner or by any method
whatsoever; and
(e) To perform the copyrighted work publicly for profit if it be a musical composi-
tion; and for the purpose of public performance for profit, and for the purposes set forth
in subsection (a) hereof, to make any arrangement or setting of it or of the melody
of it in any system of notation or any form of record in which the thought of an author
may be recorded and from which it may be read or reproduced. . ..
(f) To reproduce and distribute to the public by sale or other transfer of ownership,
or by rental, lease, or lending, reproductions of the copyrighted work if it be a sound
recording.. . ..." 17 U.S.C.A. § 1 (1952), as amended (Supp. 1974).
2. Section 5 of the Copyright Act of 1909 provided a list of 11 categories of pro-
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complete revision of copyright law has been under study by Congress
since 1955, but legislative proposals have not yet been enacted into
law.3  Typical of the history of such legislation is the most recent bill
proposing general revision of copyright law, Senate bill 1361. 4 To date
it has passed the Senate, but its future in the House is uncertain.' As
a result of congressional failure to keep copyright law abreast of de-
velopments in communication technology, courts have been required
in an increasing number of recent cases to apply the old law to these
new developments for which there is no express provision. In order
to shape remedies to new and unique legal problems by reference to
established principles of law a court may apply the Copyright Act to:
new situations not anticipated by Congress, if, fairly construed,
such situations come within its intent and meaning. . . . While
statutes should not be stretched to apply to new situations not fairly
within their scope, they should not be so narrowly construed as
to permit their evasion because of changing habits due to new in-
ventions and discoVeries. 6
Because the normal jurisprudential tools such as the words of an
tected works. In 1912 protection was extended to motion pictures, and in 1971 sound
recordings were included. For general history of section 5, see Goldstein v. California,
412 U.S. 546, 562-63 n.17 (1972).
It currently provides: "The application for registration shall specify to which of
the following classes the work in which copyright is claimed belongs:
(a) Books, including composite and cyclopedic works, directories, gazetteers, and other
compilations.
(b) Periodicals, including newspapers.
(c) Lectures, sermons, addresses (prepared for oral delivery).
(d) Dramatic or dramatico-musical compositions.
(e) Musical compositions.
(f) Maps.
(g) Works of art; models or designs for works of art.
(h) Reproductions of a work of art.
(i) Drawings or plastic works of a scientific or technical character.
(j) Photographs.
(k) Prints and pictorial illustrations including prints or labels used for articles of mer-
chandise.
(1) Motion-picture photoplays.
(m) Motion pictures other than photoplays.
(n) Sound recordings.
"The above specifications shall not be held to limit the subject matter of copyright
as defined in section 4 of this title, nor shall any error in classification invalidate or
impair the copyright protection secured under this title." 17 U.S.C.A. § 5 (1952), as
amended (Supp. 1974).
3. See S. REP. No. 93-983, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 101 (1974).
4. S. 1361, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974).
5. For some of the history of attempts to revise the 1909 Act, see Fortnightly
Corp. v. United Artists Television, Inc., 392 U.S. 390, 396 n.17 (1968).
6. Jerome H. Remick & Co. v. American Automobile Avvessories Co., 5 F.24 411
6th Cir.), cert., 4enied, 269 U.S., 556 (1925),
[Vol. 2
act, legislative history, and precedent are only minimally helpful, 7 this
note will suggest that rules are needed to guide the courts in applying
the body of copyright law to disputes arising out of the continuing flow
of unanticipated developments. For illustrative purposes, three recent
unanticipated developments will be reviewed: (1) taping of phono-
graph albums, (2) interception by community antenna television
(CATV) of broadcasts by licensed stations of copyrighted motion pic-
tures, and (3) photocopying of articles in copyrighted medical journals.
It will be shown that current judicial analysis is inconsistent from case
to case, and that results in a given factual situation are therefore unpre-
dictable.A
Further, this note will draw attention to the value of the copyright
clause in construction of copyright law.9 The language of the copyright
clause implies standards to guide courts applying copyright law to new
technological developments where no express legislative provision indi-
cates congressional intent in the matter. A set of rules of construction
will be proposed and applied to the three illustrative situations re-
viewed in this note, and the advantages they offer over ,the various
methods of analysis currently used by the courts will be pointed out.
The Current Need for Guidelines
There is currently no way to predict what standards the courts will
use in analyzing a given unanticipated development. The Court in
Goldstein v. California' considered whether the Constitution's grant
of legislative power to Congress implied that the 1909 Act occupied
the field, and its decision hinged on whether copyright protection of
sound recordings is necessarily a matter of national import. In Fort-
nightly Corp. v. United Artist Television, Inc." and Teleprompter
Corp. v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc.12 the focus for applying
established law was on analogy-whether CATV has more in common
7. See Fortnightly Corp. v. United Artists Television, Inc., 392 U.S. 390, 403
(1968) (Fortas, J., dissenting).
8. These developments have been treated individually in previous articles, e.g.,
Note, Copyright Protection of Sound Recordings, 23 DRAKE L. REV. 449 (1974); The
Sound Recording Act of 1971: An End to Piracy on the High C's? 40 GEo. WASH.
L. Rnv. 964 (1972); Note, Copyrights-Radio and Television-Cable Television Opera-
tor Subject to Liability for Copyright Infringement When Distant Signals are Imported,
87 HAv. L. Rnv. 665 (1974); Copyright Law and Library Photocopying: Striking a
Balance Between Profit Incentive and the Free Dissemination of Research Information,
48 InD. L.. 503 (1973); Note, Cable Television and Copyright Royalties, 83 YALE L.J
554 (1974).
9. The copyright clause is in article I, section 8 of the Constitution.
10. 412 U.S. 546 (1972).
11. 392 U.S. 390 (1968).
12, 415 u.S. 394 (1974).
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with the antenna on a home television set or the broadcast antennas
of a television station. Finally, the decision by the United States Court
of Claims in Williams & Wilkins Co. v. United States," currently pend-
ing before the United States Supreme Court on a petition for certiorari,
looks to the court-created doctrine of "fair use" and turns on whether
photocopying constitutes such a use.
Guidelines are also needed because no clear rules govern the as-
signment of the burden of proof between a plaintiff copyright holder
and defendant copyright infringer. There are competing considera-
tions as to who should bear the burden. On one side of the balance,
progress is promoted by providing economic incentive to writers and
publishers, and a creative individual is entitled to protection against un-
authorized interference with his intellectual property. 14  Argument
therefore can be made that copyright protection should be presumed
merited and valid, and that a defendant copyright infringer should have
the burden to justify his use. On the other side of the balance, there
is no constitutional obligation as such to extend copyright protection,
so that "in the absence of such public benefit the grant of a copyright
monopoly to individuals would be unjustified."' 5  Thus, it can be ar-
gued with equal facility that copyright protection should be presumed
unwarranted, and that a plaintiff copyright holder should be assigned
the burden of justifying copyright protection.
If there is a presumption in favor of copyright protection, or if the
defendant copyright infringer is required to justify his use, it is more
likely that copyright protection will be extended. Conversely, it is less
likely that copyright protection will be extended when there is a pre-
sumption against the desirability of copyright, or when the plaintiff
copyright holder has the burden of justifying copyright protection.
13. 172 U.S.P.Q. 670 (Ct. Cl. 1972); rev'd, 487 F.2d 1345 (Ct. Cl. 1973), cert.
granted, 417 U.S. 907 (1974).
14. "The public good fully coincides in both cases (authors' and inventors') with
the claims of individuals." THE FEDERALIST No. 43, at 279 (Mod. Lib. Ed. 1941) (1.
Madison). "[E]ncouragement of individual effort by personal gain is the best way to
advance public welfare through the talents of authors and inventors. . . ." Mazer v.
Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954). See generally Tyerman, The Economic Rationale for
Copyright Protection For Published Books: A Reply To Professor Breyer, 18 U.C.L.A.
L. REv. 1100 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Tyerman].
15. 1 M. NIMMER, NnVsMER ON COPYRIGHT § 3.1 (1974) [hereinafter cited as 1
or 2 NIMMER]. The House Committee which recommended the 1909 Act felt that
copyright was "[lot primarily for the benefit of the author, but primarily for the bene-
fit of the public." H.R. REP. No. 2222, 60th Cong., 2d Sess., 7 (1909). "[C]ourts
in passing upon particular claims of infringement must occasionally subordinate the
copyright holder's interest in a maximum financial return to the greater public interest
in the development of art, science, and industry." Williams & Wilkins Co. v. United
States, 487 F.2d 1345, 1352 (Ct. Cl. 1973), quoting from Berlin v. E.C. Publications,
Inc., 329 F.2d 541, 544 (2d Cir. 1964).
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The history of Williams & Wilkins Co. v. United States1 illustrates
how judges differ concerning the assignment of the burden of proof,
and how this affects the outcome of a case. At trial, Commissioner
Davis assumed that copyright protection is valid, and that the defendant
infringer has the burden to justify photocopying of articles in copy-
righted medical journals without compensating the plaintiff copyright
holder. He concluded that the defendant infringer failed to meet this
burden and should therefore be held liable. In contrast, when the
United States Court of Claims reviewed the decision,17 it reasoned that
the plaintiff copyright holder has the burden to justify interference with
dissemination of medical information. The court concluded that the
plaintiff copyright holder failed to meet this burden, reversed the deci-
sion of the trial court, and denied the plaintiff's petition.
Creators and users of copyrighted materials need to know the ap-
plicable standards so that they can proceed confidently in their respec-
tive activities. There are important interests at stake in each case, in-
cluding the rights of authors and composers, the economic and business
relationships of publishers, and the future progress of science and the
arts. Such interests should not be left to chance; guidelines are clearly
needed to give consistency to the method of analysis used in decisions
and to the assignment of the burden of proof between plaintiff and de-
fendant.
The Constitutional Guidelines
The copyright clause of the United States Constitution provides:
The Congress shall have Power...
To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing
for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to
their respective Writings and Discoveries. . . [and]
To make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying
into Execution the foregoing Powers .... I'
Precisely what the founding fathers intended when they wrote the
copyright clause is not known.19 However, the express provision for
copyright in the Constitution is a good indication that copyright was
considered an important and valuable property right.2"
The copyright clause must be taken into account when formulating
rules to guide courts required to apply copyright law to unanticipated
16. 172 U.S.P.Q. at 679.
17. 487 F.2d at 1353-54, 1358-59.
18. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
19. The committee that considered the copyright clause at the Federal Convention
of 1787 was conducted in secret. 1 NwMmR, supra note 15, at § 1.1.
20. See Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954).
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developments, principally because it is the sole section in the Constitu-
tion expressly concerned with the important interests at stake. The
copyright clause sets forth the purpose for all copyright law, namely,
to promote progress in science and the arts. Because the copyright
clause defines the legislative power of Congress in this area, copyright
protection which Congress creates and the courts sustain must be
framed and interpreted to pursue that purpose.
Conflict can exist between the first half of the copyright clause,
"To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts," and the second
half, "by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclu-
sive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries." While the
grant of copyright protection is one way to promote progress in science
and the arts, it is not the only way.21 For example, the dissemination
of information to the public also contributes to progress. In an ana-
logue to the tension that exists between the free exercise clause and
the establishment clause of the First Amendment of the United States
Constitution, it "may often not be possible to promote the former with-
out offending the latter. '22
Questions arise when there is conflict between the promotion of
progress in science and the arts and the promotion of private interests
of authors and inventors. Nimmer comments that the phrase 'To pro-
mote the Progress of Science and useful Arts" is not a "rigid standard"
against which every copyright act must be measured.23  However, it
is fundamental to constitutional construction that no language in the
Constitution is redundant or meaningless. 24 There is no authority to
ignore the first half of the copyright clause. The author therefore pro-
poses that the language of the copyright clause requires a general prin-
ciple of copyright law construction -that the primary obligation of
a court should be to arrive at a decision which furthers the goal of copy-
right law, to promote progress in science and the arts.
As a consequence of such a principle, it would become incumbent
upon a court to consider all elements in each case in order to determine
the best way to promote progress. These elements would include the
facts of a given unanticipated development, the asserted interests in
support of extension of copyright protection, and the constitutional and
21. The phrase "to promote" has been defined as synonymous with phrases such
as "to stimulate," "to encourage," or "to induce." Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546,
555 n.10 (1972).
22. Committee for Public Educ. and Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756,
788 (1973). See also Comment, Copyright and the First Amendment: A Gathering
Storm, 19 COPYRIGHT L. SYMP. 43 (1969); Williams & Wilkins Co. v. United States,
487 F.2d 1345, 1352 (Ct. Cl. 1973).,
23. 1 NnmmiR, supra note 15, at § 3.
24. See Holmes v. Jennison, 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) 540, 570-71 (1840).
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societal importance of the interests adversely affected if copyright pro-
tection were extended. 2 A court confronted with a new technological
development for which -there is no express provision should not plead
lack of legislative guidance and automatically refuse to extend copy-
right protection, nor should it grant copyright protection indiscrimi-
nately. Neither posture adequately protects the important interests at
stake, especially where the new situation comes fairly within the intent
and meaning of the existing copyright law, though outside its specific
terms.
As to assigning the burden of proof, the author proposes that the
language of the copyright clause implies that a court should require the
copyright holder to establish a prima facie case that the defendant is
an infringer. When the copyright holder has shown his ownership and
the defendant's unlicensed copying, the defendant should then be held
liable unless he can show that progress in science and the arts would
be curtailed by copyright protection.
It is reasonable to require a plaintiff copyright holder to establish
a prima facie case that the defendant is an infringer. The mere fact
that a certificate has been issued by the Register of Copyrights is not
basis for automatic conclusion that copyright protection is warranted in
any given case, because the Copyright Office functions primarily as an
office of record, 26 and does not scrutinize applications or copies to de-
termine questions of originality or authorship.
According to Nimmer, traditionally a copyright holder has estab-
lished a prima facie case of infringement when the following eight ele-
ments of ownership and copying have been shown: (1) there was
some relationship between the author and the plaintiff so as to consti-
tute the plaintiff a valid copyright claimant; (2) the work was original
with the author; (3) the citizenship status of the author was such as
to permit a claim of copyright; (4) the subject matter was suitable for
copyright; (5) there was proper affixation of the copyright notice on
published copies of the work in question on the title page or some other
reasonably conspicuous place; (6) a certificate of registration had been
obtained from the Copyright Office; (7) the defendant had access to
the work in question; and (8) there is a substantial similarity between
25. For an analogous formula in the context of due process and equal protection,
see San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 98-99 (1973) (dis-
senting opinion by Mr. Justice Marshall, with whom Mr. Justice Douglas concurred).
26. 17 U.S.C.A. § 209 (1952) provides for the issuance of a certificate of regis-
tration, upon payment of a fee, to the person recorded as a claimant of the copyright.
The certificate should note, inter alia, the author, title and publication date, and will
be prima facie evidence in court of these facts.
27. M. NICHOLSON, A MANuAL OF COPYRIGHT PRACnCE FOR WRrrERS, PUBLISH-
ERS, AND AGENTS 10-11 (2d ed. 1956) [hereinafter cited as NICHOLSON].
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the work of the plaintiff and that of the defendant.28
After such a showing, it seems reasonable to place the burden on
the defendant to prove that copyright protection should be withdrawn
in the specific instance of activity by the defendant. In order to break
through the shield, the defendant should be required to show by a pre-
ponderance of evidence that (1) progress in science and the arts will
be promoted by denial of copyright protection and that (2) the result-
ant benefits outweigh any possible inhibition of progress in science or
the arts as a result of denying the plaintiff copyright holder the royalty
income.
Illustrative Recent Cases
Audio Pirates
The retail sale of unauthorized tape recordings gave rise to the
conflict in Goldstein v. California.29 Tape and record "pirates" pur-
chased from retail distributors a single tape or long-playing phonograph
record of a popular musical performance they wished to duplicate.
Multiple copies were then made and sold, labeled with the same title
as the original, and with the name of the performing artist; the label
clearly stated that there was no relationship with the producer of the
28. 2 NIMMER, supra note 15, §§ 141, 141.1, 141.2. "The Copyright Act no-
where expressly invokes the requirement of originality. However, the courts have uni-
formly inferred the requirement from the fact that copyright protection may only be
claimed by 'authors' or their successors in interest. It is reasoned that since an author
is . . . 'the creator, originator' it follows that a work is not the product of an author
unless the work is original." 1 NIMMER, supra note 15, at § 10. NICHOLSON, supra
note 27, at 15, lists the following works that have been denied copyright protection: "ti-
tles of books, magazines, series, radio programs or any other titles (though they are
sometimes protected at common law); names, pen names, trade names, business names
(sometimes protected at common law or by patent); calendars having no text or pictures;
conventional and stock figures; games, dolls, toys, primarily for use, not 'perusal' (but
explanatory material accompanying them may be copyrighted as a 'book'); dances unless
they are dramatic in character (as a ballet or dance pantomime; published descriptions of
dances may be copyrighted as a 'book'); laws and opinions of courts; legal forms, with-
out original matter; slogans, mottoes, 'wisecracks,' and gags (but a slogan or title may
be a trade mark, protected at common law or by patent); blank books, record books,
checks, journal books, index cards, or other material designed for physical use rather
than perusal; ideas, plots, themes, theories, opinions, apart from their literary expression
(sometimes protected at common law); price lists, railway tickets, and time tables; stand-
ardized expressions, clauses, phrases; mere 'aggregation' of old material, as opposed to
a 'compilation'; systems, schemes, methods, plans; immoral, seditious, or piratical
works; news, facts, works in the public domain, government publications; works on
which copyright has expired; works still in copyright in other countries but that have
been published and sold in the United States without notice; works xith fatally improper
copyright notices." (punctuation added).
29. 412 U.S. 546 (1972).
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original sound recording.30 The cost to the owner of original produc-
tion of some of the recordings at issue exceeded $100,000, yet the cost
to the pirates was minimal, limited to the purchase price of the sound
recording from a retail distributor and the relatively low costs of dupli-
cation. The pirates made no payment to the copyright holder such as
a royalty or license fee, nor to the artists, nor to the agents of the artists.
The pirates were prosecuted in California, a state whose sound
studios constituted an important local economic resources1 and whose
law made it a misdemeanor to transfer any performance fixed on a tape
or record onto other records or tapes with the intent of selling the dupli-
cates without the permission of the copyright holder. 2  The acts of
piracy at issue occurred before 1971, the year that the Copyright Act
of 1909 was amended to extend copyright protection to sound record-
ings. 33
The pirates in Goldstein argued that the state law was invalid as
it conflicted with the copyright clause by granting a copyright of un-
limited duration. Secondly, the state law was assertedly invalid under
the supremacy clause, because Congress intended to establish a uni-
form law of nationwide scope."4 Finally, the pirates argued that the
Copyright Act's grant of power to the states to protect unpublished ma-
terials could not be applied to these materials since they had been pub-
lished.
30. For details on the mechanics of tape piracy, see Tape Indus. Assn. of America
v. Younger, 316 F. Supp. 340, 342-43 (C.D. Cal. 1970), appeal dismissed, 401 U.S. 902
(1971).
31. Nashville, New York, and Los Angeles are national centers of recording studio
activity.
32. "(a) Every person is guilty of a misdemeanor who: (1) Knowingly and will-
fully transfers or causes to be transferred any sounds recorded on a phonograph record
... tape ... or other article on which sounds are recorded, with intent to sell or cause
to be sold ... such article on which sounds are so transferred, without the consent of
the owner. . . ." CAL. PEN. CoDn § 653h (West 1970).
33. See note 2 supra.
34. The pirates emphasized the language of 17 U.S.C.A. §§ 4 and 5 as evidencing
an intent by Congress to make these the exclusive areas to which the copyright might
apply. Section 4 provides: 'The works for which copyright may be secured under this
title shall include all the writings of an author." Section 5 lists other types of copyright-
able material (see note 2 supra). In addition to alleging that Congress had so occupied
the field of copyright as to preempt state action, the pirates argued that the United States
Supreme Court had recognized a congressional intent to establish such a scheme in two
decisions, Sears Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225 (1964) and Compco Corp.
v. Day-Brite Lighting Inc., 376 U.S. 234 (1964). Sears held that an injunction could not
be obtained under the state unfair competition law for a "pole lamp" where design and
mechanical patent had been denied for want of invention. Compco held a state unfair
competition law invalid for conflict with federal patent law, where the state law pro-
tected a design on a lighting fixture that was not entitled to a design patent.
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The Court's Analysis
The United States Supreme Court rejected these arguments and
held that the state law was valid, using the following analysis. Since
tape recording is a development of the last three decades the 1909 Act
does not address the present problem, and until Goldstein was heard
no decision had dealt with the construction of congressional silence
in the context of copyright law. The general principles for determin-
ing the power of states to legislate in the face of congressional silence
have been developed in cases concerned with the commerce clause. 5
The Court took note of these rules, and concluded that the nature of
copyright presented no barrier to the states' legislating coordinate copy-
right protection since some of the "subject matter to which the copy-
right clause is addressed may . . . be of purely local importance and
not worthy of national attention or protection. . . ."3 A nation-wide
interest in sound recordings requiring an inference that state power to
grant copyright should be relinquished to exclusive federal control
could not be discerned. The argument that the copyright clause per
se preempts state law concerned with copyright was therefore con-
cluded to be invalid.
The Court found that the scheme set forth in the Copyright Act
did not "occupy the field" because no section made an express state-
ment concerning sound recordings. Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel
Co.17 and Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc.3 did contain lan-
guage to the effect that the silence of Congress should be taken -to "re-
flect a judgment that free competition should prevail" in the context of
copyright law. 9 However, Sears and Compco were at bottom patent
law cases, and the Court reasoned that the rule of those cases should be
limited to correspond with their facts. Therefore, the argument that
federal policy preempted state law giving copyright protection to sound
recordings was held to be invalid.
The Guideline Analysis
If the proposed guidelines are used, the analysis proceeds differ-
ently. The starting point is the same: it is first noted that Congress
in 1909 did not envision the scope of the modem record industry, or
the tape recorder technology that currently exists, and it is therefore
not surprising that there is no express provision in the 1909 Act con-
35. Cooley v. Board of Wardens, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299, 319-20 (1851); Gibbons
v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 195 (1824).
36. 412 U.S. at 558.
37. 376 U.S. at 230-31.
38. 376 U.S. at 237.
39. Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546, 577-78 (1972) (Marball, J., dissent-
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cerned with tape piracy. However, tape piracy is a development that
fairly comes within the scope of the Copyright Act. The "Writings"
requirement in the copyright clause has been liberally construed,40 and
a sound recording has been held to be a writing in a constitutional sense
even though it is not visually perceptible.41 Similarly, the "Science and
useful Arts" phrase is not a limitation;42 the fact that a work is likely
to amuse rather than instruct does not render it incapable of copyright
protection. 43  Even a work such as a rock-and-roll record satisfies the
"useful" requirement if its merit is sufficient to cause an unauthorized
person to attempt to duplicate it.
The act itself leaves room for state law to protect works prior to
publication,44 but that does not imply that state laws concerned with
published works are preempted. There is no need for preemption so
long as the state law merely facilitates the accomplishment of the goal
of federal copyright protection, namely, the promotion of progress in
science and the arts. Of course, that determination must be on a case
by case basis.
All eight points required for a prima facie case appear to be satis-
fied. There seems to have been no question that the original record
producers in Goldstein have satisfactory ownership status, 46 and it
seems clear that the pirates "copied. 46 Thus, a prima facie case exists
that the pirates are infringers, and should be held liable unless they
can show by a preponderance of evidence that progress in science and
the arts would be promoted to a greater extent without copyright pro-
tection of sound recordings.
The total market for a modern "hit" record is large, but limited
in time. Unauthorized duplication by pirates does allow a wider dis-
semination of music at a lower cost. However, owning and playing a
tape is a quasi luxury; ,there may be less public interest at stake compel-
ling dissemination of low cost hit records than that arguing in favor of
the dissemination of news. 47 In addition, the investment of capital and
40. See Reiss v. National Quotation Bureau, 276 F. 717, 719 (S.D.N.Y. 1921); 1
NIMMER, supra note 15, at § 8.1.
41. See Capitol Records Inc. v. Mercury Records Corp., 221 F.2d 657 (2d Cir.
1955); Shaab v. Kleindienst, 345 F. Supp. 589 (D.D.C. 1972).
42. 1 NIMMER, supra note 15, at § 3.2.
43. See Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239 (1903).
44. "Nothing in this title shall be construed to annul or limit the right of the au-
thor or proprietor of an unpublished work, at common law or in equity, to prevent the
copying, publication, or use of such unpublished work without his consent, and to obtain
damages therefor." 17 U.S.C.A. § 2 (1952).
45. 412 U.S. at 548.
46. Id. at 549.
47. See International News Service v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 250 (1918)
(Brandeis, J., dissenting).
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labor by the original producer is large and with a relatively small invest-
ment the pirates ride on the coattails of the original producer. If there
is no copyright protection, and if a pirate is able to reach the buyers
first, he will reap profits that fairly belong to the original producer, and
will undermine the possibility of financial success for the original pro-
ducer.
The facts suggest that the pirates wanted the lion's share of the
profits while the lion's share of the work was done by the original pro-
ducer. It is unclear how progress in science and the arts would be pro-
moted by such a situation. Since the pirates fail to carry their burden
of proof, deference should be given to the traditional notion that prog-
ress will be promoted by copyright protection and economic incentive
for the original producers of a work. Thus, it may be concluded that
the state law at issue promotes progress in music, and the congressional
silence about sound recordings may be fairly construed to allow such
a state law.
The Court's Analysis Versus The Guidelines
The analysis using the guidelines suggested by the copyright
clause and the Court's analysis both lead to the conclusion that the state
law at issue is valid. The main difference is that the guidelines look
directly to the language of the copyright clause to learn how congres-
sional silence should be construed, while the Court first looks to
rules derived in cases concerned with the commerce clause for
guidance on how to construe congressional silence in the context of
copyright law.
The approach of the Court on the issue of whether the copyright
clause per se pre-empted the state law shows that sound rules of con-
struction in one context can be successfully used to meet new problems.
However, the Court's treatment of Sears and Compco was not entirely
satisfactory. These cases did suggest that state laws concerned with
copyright would be held invalid, even if the Court felt that such a policy
had no basis in the facts of those cases, and that such a policy would
be inappropriate. The fact that the Court in Goldstein found it neces-
sary to limit Sears and Compco confirms the desirability of guidelines
that give consistency and predictability from decision to decision.
Community Antenna Television
Issues involved in reception and retransmission by community an-
tenna television (CATV) of broadcasts by licensed stations of copy-
righted motion pictures are raised in Fortnightly Corp. v. United Artists
Television, Inc.48 and Teleprompter Corp. v. Columbia Broadcasting
48. 392 U.S. 390 (1968).
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System, Inc.49 The Fortnightly Corporation owned and operated a sys-
tem of antennas in an area within the normal range of signals from five
surrounding television stations." However, most of the residents in
that area were unable to receive broadcasts because of interference by
hilly terrain. The Fortnightly antennas were larger than ordinary roof-
top antennas and were erected on hills. The system amplified the sig-
nals received, converted them to a different frequency in order to main-
tain and improve strength, and carried the signals via cable to the home
television sets of subscribers. The viewer could then select programs
from the five stations by turning the knob on his television set. The
Fortnightly CATV system did not originate any programs, nor did it
edit or alter any of the programs received. The CATV system was
operated for profit, and the source of revenue was a flat monthly fee-
for-service charge to subscribers. The CATV system did not attempt
to make additional income by substituting its own set of advertisers in
the time slots allotted.
United Artists Television, Inc., had sold licenses to broadcast sev-
eral copyrighted motion pictures to the five television stations. The
Fortnightly CATV system received and transmitted these broadcasts
without permission of United Artists or the broadcasting station.
United Artists charged that Fortnightly thereby infringed the exclusive
right of United Artists under section 1(c) of the Copyright Act to per-
form nondramatic literary works in public for profit, and its exclusive
right under section 1(d) to perform dramatic works publicly."" CATV
countered by focusing on the meaning of the word "perform" and
claiming that it had not performed at all.
The Teleprompter CATV system was similar to that in Fortnightly
to the extent that it was a passive conduit to the viewer of the broad-
casts received.52 However, the distance of transmission was much
greater in Teleprompter than in Fortnightly, and the ultimate viewer
in Teleprompter was located beyond the normal range of television sig-
nals from the originating station.5 3
In addition, Teleprompter CATV had diversified. It had begun
49. 415 U.S. 394 (1974).
50. The Fortnightly CATV system was able to pick up signals from a station 82
miles away. The curvature of the earth gives rise to natural boundaries to television
markets, because television waves travel in straight lines. Reception by an ordinary
rooftop antenna becomes impossible beyond a certain distance from the originating
source.
51. 17 U.S.C.A. § 1 (1952), as amended (Supp. 1974) (text quoted in note 1 su-
pra).
52. In some of the systems at issue, point-to-point microwave was used in combi-
nation with cable transmission. 415 U.S. at 408.
53. In some of the systems at issue, the distance between the point of original
transmission and ultimate viewer was greater than 450 miles. Id. at 400.
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to originate programs wholly ind6pendent of -the intercepted transmis-
sions and had begun to form an interconnecting network with other
CATV systems. Through this network, distribution rights to the orig-
inated programs were resold. It was also selling advertising time, but
only on the originated programs.
The Court's Analysis
In both Fortnightly and Teleprompter, the United State Supreme
Court reasoned that not all uses of copyrighted works constitute an in-
fringement; only those uses enumerated in Section 1 of the Copyright
Act are reserved to the copyright holder.5 4  Thus, if a CATV system
has not "performed" the copyrighted motion pictures, then it has not
put those films to a use enumerated in section 1, and should not be
held liable for copyright infringement.
In both Fortnightly and Teleprompter, the Court concluded that
the CATV had not "performed" the films at issue. Under its analysis
in Fortnightly, television requires activity by viewers as well as broad-
casters.5 5 The viewer must provide equipment to convert electronic
signals into audible sound and visible images. The Court therefore
concluded that it was reasonable -to define the term "perform" function-
ally, saying that it is broadcasters, not viewers, who perform. As the
Court explained in Teleprompter:
When a television broadcaster transmits a program, it has made
public for simultaneous viewing and hearing the contents of that
program. The privilege of receiving the -broadcast electronic sig-
nals and of converting them into the sights and sounds of the pro-
gram inheres in all members of the public who have the means of
doing so.58
It follows from this functional definition of the term "perform"
that copyright protection depends on whether a given CATV system
functions on the broadcaster's .or the viewer's side of the line in the
total process of broadcasting and receiving. The Court in Fortnightly
concluded that the Fortnightly CATV system functioned as a well-lo-
cated antenna with an efficient connection to the viewer's television set
that enhanced the viewer's capacity to receive the broadcaster's sig-
nals.57 The reception and rechanneling of the signals for simultaneous
54. 'The Copyright Act does not give a copyright holder control over all uses of
his copyrighted work. Instead, § 1 of the Act enumerates several *rights' that are made
'exclusive' to the holder of the copyright." Fortnightly Corp. v. United Artists Televi-
sion, Inc., 392 U.S. 390, 393-94 (1968). "Use" is not the same as "infringement," and
use short of infringement is to be encouraged. Id. at 393 n.8. See B. KAPLAN, AN UN-
HuRrIED VIEW OF COPYRIGHT 57 (1967); 1 NIMMER, supra note 15, at § 100.
55. 392 U.S. at 397-98.
56. 415 U.S. at 408.
37. 392 U.S. at 399,
[Vol. 2
viewing by Fortnightly was therefore deemed to be essentially a viewer
function; and, in the absence of "performance," there was no copyright
infringement.
The same conclusion was drawn in Teleprompter.58 Argument
that transmission by Teleprompter CATV miles beyond the normal
range of broadcast signals converted the CATV into a "performer" was
rejected. Argument that CATV had become a "broadcaster" as a re-
sult of its diversified activities was also rejected, because Teleprompter
had been careful to keep its original programs, interconnecting ar-
rangements, and sale of advertising time independent of the copy-
righted motion pictures received and transmitted. Thus, the Tele-
prompter CATV system continued to function on the viewer's side of
the line with respect to the copyrighted works at issue, and there was
no copyright infringement.
Finally, argument that Teleprompter interfered with the ability of
copyright holders to extract recompense for their creativity and labor
was rejected. Television advertisers, and not television viewers, are
the source of funds from which copyright holders are paid; and since
advertisers typically pay a fee based on an estimate of the expected
number and character of the viewers who watch the program, the Court
concluded that a copyright holder should be able to demand a greater
fee calculated on the basis of the size of the direct broadcast market
augmented by the size of the CATV market.
The Guideline Analysis
Using the proposed guidelines, analysis of the facts reveals that
radio was in its infancy in 1909, and that television had not even been
invented.5" The 1909 Act makes no express provision for CATV, but
the subject of CATV interception of broadcasts from licensed stations
of copyrighted motion pictures fairly comes within the scope of that
law. The "Writings" requirement in the copyright clause is not a limita-
tion, because a motion picture film has been held to be a writing in
a constitutional sense. 0 Similarly, the "Science and useful Arts"
phrase is not a limitation. The fact that the CATV systems desired
to receive and transmit broadcasts of the copyrighted films is sufficient
to satisfy the "useful" requirement.61
All eight points required for a prima facie case appear to be satis-
fied. There seems to be no question in the CATV cases that the plain-
58. 415 U.S. at 408.
59. Fortnightly Corp. v. United Artists Television, Inc., 392 U.S. 390, 395-96
(1968).
60. Kalem Co. v. Harper Bros., 222 U.S. 55 (1911).
61. See Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S, 239, 249 (1903); 1
NimmER, supra note 15, at § 3.2.
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tiff copyright holders have valid ownership status. There is also no
question that the defendant CATV systems "copy," in view of the fact
that the CATV systems (1) have access to the signals from the licensed
broadcaster, and (2) provide viewers with films substantially similar to
those of the copyright holders. Thus, a prima facie case exists that
the CATV systems are infringers. The CATV companies should
therefore be held liable unless they can show by a preponderance of
evidence that progress in science and the arts would be promoted to
a greater extent without copyright protection.
Watching films on television is another example of a quasi luxury;
there is no public interest at stake compelling free dissemination of
them analogous to the public interest in dissemination of news. 62 The
facts suggest that the CATV plaintiffs desired to receive and transmit
broadcasts of the copyrighted films for their own profit, and it is not
clear whether progress in science and the arts would be promoted
thereby.
It may therefore be concluded that (1) the CATV systems fail
to carry the burden of proof that progress in science and the arts would
be promoted to a greater extent without copyright protection, (2) def-
erence should be given to -the traditional notion that progress will be
promoted by copyright protection and economic incentive, and (3) in
contrast to the technical definition used in the analysis by the Court,
the CATV systems may be fairly said to "perform" the copyrighted
films, and should be held liable for copyright infringement.
The Court's Analysis Versus The Guidelines
The conclusion following the guidelines is the opposite of that
reached by the Court. Under the guidelines, copyright protection is
extended; under the Court's approach, copyright protection is denied.
The difference between the two approaches is clear. In construing the
word "perform," the guidelines focus on whether progress in science
and the arts would be promoted to a greater extent without copyright
protection, while the Court focuses solely on whether the CATV system
at issue functions as a broadcaster or as a viewer.
The guidelines approach seems more attractive for several rea-
sons. As stated previously, there is no great public interest compelling
free dissemination of films, analogous to the need for free communica-
tion of news. 63
Secondly, the Court's economic analysis is not entirely satisfactory.
62. Cf. International News Service v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 234-36(1918).
63. See notes 128 and 134 infra.
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For example, the Court in Teleprompter predicted that advertisers
would be willing to pay greater fees to broadcasters because of the in-
crease in audience resulting from distant CATV transmission. 4 How-
ever, some advertisers aim at local viewers to a considerable extent and
would not be willing to pay more, because they would not derive signif-
icant benefit from CATV carriage of sponsored programs outside the
station's normal service area.65
Finally, prior to Fortnightly, Buck v. Jewell-LaSalle Realty Co. 6
was the settled law on the subject of copyright infringement and
secondary transmissions. In that case, decided in 1931, a hotel had
received on its master radio set a copyrighted song that had been broad-
cast without the permission of the copyright holder. The hotel had
then transmitted the song to all the public and private rooms of the
hotel by means of speakers. Argument that copyright protection
should be limited to the initial radio rendition was rejected, the broad-
cast by the hotel was held to constitute a "performance," and the hotel
was held liable for copyright infringement.
The facts of Buck are not significantly different from those in
Fortnightly, except that the primary transmission was not licensed in
Buck. Given the conclusion of the Court in Buck that the hotel was
liable for infringement, the conclusion that the Fortnightly CATV is not
liable comes as a surprise, even though the Court appears to reconcile
the two cases. In contrast, Buck would appear to be good law under
the guidelines, for reasons similar to those considered in analysis of
Fortnightly and Teleprompter, and the guidelines would therefore
seem advantageous to the extent that they facilitate predictability from
decision to decision.
Photocopying
Rapid and inexpensive photocopying became available after 1960.
Photocopying of articles in medical journals soon became a widespread
practice for many reasons. 7 Medical researchers found that they could
save time, in comparison to that required to make a hand copy or to
request a copy from the publisher.68 Medical libraries found that they
64. 415 U.S. at 411.
65. Id. at 420 n.5 (Douglas, I., dissenting).
66. 283 U.S. 191 (1931).
67. See Williams & Wilkins Co. v. United States, 487 F.2d 1345, 1379-80 (Ct. Cl.
1973).
68. There is a difference of opinion as to the availability of back issues from pub-
lishers. The majority in Williams & Wilkins Co. states that the plaintiff does not at-
tempt to keep a stock of back issues, and instead refers requests for reprints to the author
of the article. Id. at 1357 n.17. The dissenting opinion states that the publisher for-
wards requests for out-of-print articles to the Institute of Scientific Information, which
is licensed by plaintiff to make copies. Id. at 1370.
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could increase the total circulation of information and reduce costs
replacing vandalized pages and lost volumes.69 Medical practitioners
and students found that they could easily have information on the most
recent developments for permanent reference in their personal files.
It is generally conceded that medical science and practice would be se-
riously hurt if photocopying of articles in medical journals were discon-
tinued.7 0
The work of the physicians and other scientists engaged in medical
research has been supported in large part by "conditional gifts," annual
grants made by the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare on
the basis of research proposals submitted by prospective grantees. 71
Modem research requires a sizeable outlay for laboratory space, sophis-
ticated equipment, and specialists,72 and federal grants for 1973 totaled
nearly one billion dollars.7 3  In comparison with the economic support,
the time, and the intellectual and physical labor required to produce
a scientific work, the cost of typesetting an article and its subsequent
packaging is relatively minor.
The world of medical research is not immune from the pressures
of "publish or perish," and while publication may not be of immediate
monetary benefit to the researchers who author the articles, it is crucial
to their long term professional and economic opportunities. The qual-
ity of articles approved by the editorial board of one journal may be
substantially different from that accepted by another, and there is con-
siderable competition to get manuscripts accepted and published by
leading journals. Private publishers currently provide dissemination of
95 percent of medical research articles, and customarily bear the ex-
pense of screening, editing, publishing, and disseminating; it is rare for
a researcher to publish results at his own expense. 4
The 1909 Act contains no express provision concerning photo-
copying. The Library of Congress at that time freely permitted photo-
graphing of copyrighted articles, and over the next three decades
placed no restrictions on photo-duplication.7 5  A "gentlemen's agree-
69. Henry, Copyright, Public Policy, and Information Technology, 183 SCIENCE
384, 389 (1974).
70. Williams & Wilkins Co. v. United States, 487 F.2d 1345, 1356 (Ct. Cl. 1973).
71. Williams & Wilkins Co. v. United States, 172 U.S.P.Q. 670, 683 (Ct. Cl.
1972).
72. See The Photocopy Conundrum, 222 J.A.M.A. 211, 212 (1972).
73. In fiscal year 1973, NIH made 11,317 research grants and awards, exclusive
of grants for scientific evaluation purposes. The value of these grants totaled $815,-
194,484. U.S. NATIONAL INsTrTuTES OF HEALTH, PUBLic HEALTH SERViCE GRANTS AND
AWARDS, Part I, at 1 (1973).
74. See Williams & Wilkins Co. v. United States, 172 U.S.P.Q. 670, 676 (Ct. Cl.
1972).
75. See Williams & Wilkins Co. v. United States, 487 F.2d 1345, 1351 (Ct. CI.
1973).
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ment" to prevent abuse of photocopying was drafted in 1935 between
the now defunct National Association of Book Publishers and the Joint
Committee on Materials for Research (representing libraries with
photocopying equipment). 76 The book publishers promised not to
bring suit for copyright infringement against library photocopying so
long as the photocopying was without profit to the libraries, and the
amount copied was insubstantial. Photocopying was still relatively ex-
pensive and infrequently used at the time this agreement was drafted,
and no periodical publishers were represented.
The issues involved in photocopying articles from copyrighted
medical journals were raised in Williams & Wilkins Co. v. United
States.77 A publisher of several medical journals, Williams & Wilkins
Company brought suit for copyright infringement under 28 U.S.C. §
1498(b) 78 and 17 U.S.C. § l(a) 79 against the National Institutes of
Health (NIH) and the National Library of Medicine (NLM). The
NIH is the principal medical research organization of the United States
government, and it runs a photocopy service for the benefit of its re-
search staff.80 On request, a researcher is furnished with a photocopy
of a desired article in -the NIH library. These photocopies are usually
kept by the researcher in his private files for future reference.
The NLM, a repository of much of the world's medical literature,
operated an "inter-library loan" program, where it would furnish re-
questing libraries with photocopies of desired articles free of charge
and on a no-return basis. About twelve percent of the NLM inter-
library loan requests came from private or commercial organizations
such as drug companies. The loan policy of NLM concerning journal
articles was consistent with the General Interlibrary Code, self-imposed
regulations similar to those in the "gentlemen's agreement" of 1935,
and followed by all libraries which cooperated in the inter-library loan
program. For example, the NLM would provide only one photocopy
of a particular article per request, and would not photocopy an entire
journal. Each article reproduced by NLM was marked, "This is a sin-
gle photostatic copy made by the National Library of Medicine for pur-
76. The agreement read in part: "A library... owning books or periodical vol-
umes in which copyright still subsists may make and deliver a single photographic re-
production ... of a part thereof to a scholar representing in writing that he desires such
reproduction in lieu of loan of such publication or in place of manual transcription and
solely for the purposes of research... "' Id. at 1355-56.
77. 487 F.2d 1345 (Ct. Cl. 1973).
78. 28 U.S.C. § 1498(b) (1970) permits an action to be brought against the
United States for copyright infringement and provides recovery of "reasonable and en-
tire compensation" as the exclusive remedy.
79. 17 U.S.C.A. § I(a) (1952). See text in note 1 supra.
80. 487 F.2d at 1347-48.
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poses of study or research in lieu of lending the original."81 The extent
to which NIH and NLM enforced their self-imposed rules to limit abuse
of photocopying was a matter of controversy.82  At any rate, the photo-
copying by NIH and NLM exceeded the output of many small publish-
ing companies. In 1970 NIH copied 85,744 articles, NLM copied
93,746, and the length of an average journal article was ten pages.83
The articles that give rise to suit had appeared in journals with
notice of copyright in the name of Williams & Wilkins Company at the
front. In some instances, there was also notice of copyright in the
name of the plaintiff publisher at the beginning of an article.8 4 Certif-
icates of copyright registration had been issued by the Register of
Copyrights to the Williams & Wilkins Company after compliance with
the requisite statutory requirements. It was the policy of the federal
government prior to 1965 not to reserve any rights in copyrighted pub-
lications stemming from grant funded research. 5 However, this policy
was modified on July 1, 1965. After that date, grantees were still free
to arrange for publication and copyright without approval of the govern-
ment, but the government reserved a license free of royalty to repro-
duce, publish, and use any such publication."6 The articles at issue
were the product of research funded by government grants prior to July
1, 1965.
Most of the revenue of Williams & Wilkins Company came from
subscription sales, and only a small part came from advertisers. The
profit realized varied from $1,000 to $7,000 annually. In 1967 NLM
monitored the photocopying of Williams & Wilkins Company journals
for ninety days. If NLM had been required to pay royalties, the addi-
81. Id. at 1348.
82. The majority in Williams & Wilkins Co. adopted the view that "[b]oth librar-
ies have declared and enforced reasonably strict limitations which, to our mind, keep
the duplication within appropriate confines .... Though exceptions are made, they do
not appear to be excessive, unwarranted, or irrational." Id. at 1354. However, Chief
Judge Cowen, dissenting, stated, "[tihe findings of fact show the exceptions are rou-
tinely granted by the defendant's libraries, that there is no way to enforce most of the
limitations ....
[Ihe libraries will duplicate the same article over and over again, even for the
same user, within a short space of time." Id. at 1365-66.
83. Id. at 1348.
84. Each article in a journal is protected if the entire issue is protected. Id. at
1349-50 n.6. "The copyright provided by this title shall protect all the copyrightable
component parts of the work copyrighted .... The copyright upon composite works
or periodicals shall give to the proprietor thereof all the rights in respect thereto which
he would have if each part were individually copyrighted under this title." 17 U.S.C.A.
§ 3 (1952).
85. Williams & Wilkins Co. v. United States, 172 U.S.P.Q. 670, 683-84 (Ct. Cl.
1972).
86. Id. at 684-85.
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tional annual income to the plaintiff publisher would have been $1,000
to $1,200, assuming that the period monitored was representative.87
As plaintiff, Williams & Wilkins Company stressed that there is
a limited and static market for the material in medical journals; that
the costs of publication continually increase; that if subscription prices
are raised to reflect increased costs, there is incentive to obtain the ma-
terial by photocopying and to discontinue subscriptions; and that, even-
tually, profit from publication would become non-existent because of
the combination of rising costs, fewer subscriptions, and more photo-
copying. 8  Publishers would have to discontinue publication or be-
come increasingly dependent on government subsidy. As a solution
Williams & Wilkins Company proposed -to establish a licensing system
with a minimum of red tape which would not interfere with the dissemi-
nation of information, but would ensure that the publisher could con-
tinue to make articles available in the future. There were obvious
costs in the transaction of photocopying which were being paid such
as those of the copying equipment, the paper and electricity to run the
machines, the stamps to mail the copies, the salaries of the workers who
do the copying, and the salaries of the librarians who supervise the
copying. Williams & Wilkins Company thought that publishers who
made the articles being duplicated were equally deserving, and should
be paid a fair and reasonable royalty.
The Analysis by the Court of Claims
Commissioner James F. Davis of the United States Court of
Claims was the first to hear the case, and concluded that the govern-
ment should be held liable for wholesale copying and copyright in-
fringement.8 9 On appeal, the United States Court of Claims arrived
at the opposite conclusion in a four to three decision. 90 The court rea-
soned that, despite the practices of NIH and NLM, the plaintiff pub-
lisher was making a profit, and therefore could not show that it was
being or would be substantially harmed. To the contrary, there was
a risk that medicine and medical research might be injured if copyright
protection was extended, because library photocopying and dissemina-
tion of information would probably be impeded. In the interim, until
there was a legislative solution to the problem of accommodating the
interests of science with those of publishers, the court concluded that
87. Williams & Wilkins Co. v. United States, 487 F.2d 1345, 1369, 1371 (Ct. CI.
1973).
88. These points have also been aired in Congress. See, e.g., Hearings on S. 1361
Before the Subcomm. on Patents, Trademarks, and Copyrights of the Senate Comm. on
the Judiciary, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., 155-57 (1973) [hereinafter referred to as Hearings].
89. Williams & Wilkins Co. v. United States, 172 U.S.P.Q. 670 (Ct. Cl. 1972),
90. Williams & Wilkins Co. v. United States, 487 F.2d 1345 (Ct. Cl. 1973).
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risk of such harm should not be placed upon science and medicine.
The photocopying by NIH and NLM therefore constituted a "fair use,"
and those organizations were not liable for copyright infringement.
The Guideline Analysis
Alternatively, analysis under the proposed guidelines would recog-
nize that, as late as 1935, photocopying posed no substantial threat to
the potential market for copyrighted works, because it was a cumber-
some, expensive and little used means of duplication. It is therefore
not surprising that the 1909 Act has no express provision to deal with
the rapid, cheap and large scale photocopying that exists today.
There is no question that NIH and NLM "copy" within the mean-
ing of the copyright law, since they have access to the copyrighted
works at issue and provide researchers with a work substantially similar
to the articles published by the copyright holder. However, the subject
matter of articles in copyrighted medical journals has much in common
with works that have been denied copyright protection such as news,
facts, works in the public domain, government publications, and works
designed for practical use rather -than perusal.,1 The essence of a
medical article is often a case history, a photograph, or a table of num-
bers that any competent researcher should be able to produce, even
though the results to some extent are a function of the ingenuity and
persistence of the researcher, and even though each article has some
uniqueness of expression." There is a strong public interest compel-
ling free dissemination of medical articles; information used in treat-
ment of patients by physicians is not a quasi luxury analogous to records
and movies, and the research leading to the articles has been heavily
supported by public funds. Taking these factors into consideration,
medical articles seem to be a subject on the borderline of appropriate-
ness for copyright protection. However, Congress has expressly in-
cluded periodicals in its list of protected works, and the express policy
of the government is that recipients of research funds are free to make
arrangements for publication and copyright as desired. 3  It therefore
must be concluded that articles in medical journals are an appropriate
subject for copyright protection, and a prima facie case that NIH and
NLM are infringers has been established.94
91. See note 28 supra.
92. See Goldstein, The Private Consumption of Public Goods: A Comment on
Williams & Wilkins Co. v. United States, 21 BuLL. COPYRIGHT Soc'Y U.S.A. 204, 208
(1974).
93. 17 U.S.C.A. § 5(b) (1952). See text at note 2 supra.
94. See note 84 supra. For the purposes of the case, the court of claims assumed
without deciding that the plaintiff publisher was the proper copyright owner and entitled
to sue. The d4endtants NIH and NLM contested the publisher's claim to be the copy-
[Vol. 2
COPYRIGHT CLAUSE
It seems clear that the defendants NIH and NLM would save
money if there were denial of copyright protection. There would be
no need to pay copyright royalties; the administrative costs and the
practical inconvenience of a licensing system would be avoided;95 and
more photocopying would allow overall reduction in the cost of sub-
scription to medical journals, together with reduction in the cost of re-
placing vandalized pages and lost volumes. 96 The defendants NIH and
NLM are government organizations with finite budgets, and it is rea-
sonable to assume that any money saved by photocopying will be ex-
pended to promote progress in science; for example, in the case of NIH,
by support of research, and in the case of NLM, by the acquisition of
additional books and journals needed by researchers. Thus, there is
a substantial showing that progress in science will be promoted by de-
nying copyright protection and the defendants NIH and NLM success-
fully pass the first hurdle that the defendants in Goldstein, Fortnightly,
and Teleprompter were unable to overcome.
The amount of damage sustained by Williams & Wilkins Company
if copyright protection were to be denied is open to speculation. If
royalties had been paid, the $1,000 additional annual income predicted
in 1967 seems small in the sense that the profits of the enterprise
would still be marginal, and it is unlikely that the amount of royalty
income would be sufficient to save the plaintiff publisher from bank-
ruptcy assuming that costs continue to rise. In addition, even if copy-
right protection were to be extended and a licensing system established,
there is no doubt that NIH and NLM have the right to copy, without
royalty payment to publishers, articles stemming from awards granted
after July 1, 1965.17 A large part of medical research today is sup-
ported by government grants, and data show that eighty-five percent
of the material photocopied by libraries in the United States is less than
five years old.98 Thus, because of facts peculiar to the case, it is pos-
sible that the major portion of copying by NIH and NLM will soon be
royalty free, and the damage, if any, to the plaintiff will progressively
become de minimis.
However, a precise determination of the damages to the plaintiff
right "proprietor," on the ground that the individual authors of the articles were the own-
ers, and that they had not assigned their rights to the plaintiff publisher. Williams &
Wilkins Co. v. United States, 487 F.2d 1345, 1349 (Ct. Cl. 1973).
95. See Breyer, The Uneasy Case For Copyright: A Study of Copyright in Books,
Photocopies, and Computer Programs, 84 H~Av. L. REv. 281, 332 (1970).
96. Henry, Copyright, Public Policy, and Information Technology, 183 Science
384, 388-89 (1974).
97. Williams & Wilkins Co. v. United States, 172 U.S.P.Q. 670, 683 (Ct. Cl.
1972).
98. Id. at 685,
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publisher is not critical to the case. Rather, the key question is the
amount of damage sustained by progress in science if the plaintiff is
denied the royalty income that otherwise would have accrued.
Williams & Wilkins Company has predicted that if copyright protection
were to be denied, publishers will find it necessary either to discontinue
publication or become dependent on government subsidy.99 The im-
plication is that either possibility would be detrimental to progress in
science. However, the federal government currently underwrites many
non-profit scientific journals,100 and it does not seem likely that the gov-
ernment would invest a large amount of money in a research project
and then be unwilling to pay the relatively small amount required to
cover publication of the results. Thus, even if the plaintiff publisher
goes out of business, scientific publishing and progress will go on.
Similarly, it is unclear how dependence on government subsidy
will lead to hampering of progress in science, unless it is hypothesized
that the government will abuse its economic power and attempt to con-
trol ideas. However, any danger of such abuse is present whether
copyright protection is extended or denied, because the government
has ample opportunity to control ideas in research when it initially se-
lects the proposed projects to be awarded government support.
To summarize, defendants NIH and NLM can show that (1)
denial of copyright would benefit progress in science, and (2) progress
in science would not be hampered even if Williams & Wilkins Company
went out of business. Thus, the resultant benefits outweigh any injury
to progress in science by the denial of copyright royalty income to the
plaintiff publisher. NIH and NLM have met their burden of proof,
and therefore should not be held liable for copyright infringement.
Of course, the practice of library photocopying is not limited to
the field of medical research; rather, it is common to the full range of
printed materials, be they academic or popular. Potential infringers
in other areas should take heed that the defendants under the guide-
lines are presumed liable until the defendants can show by a prepon-
derance of evidence that they are not. It is therefore wise for the po-
tential infringer to exercise self-restraint, because the result might well
go against the defendant whose activity is not closely analogous to that
of NIH and NLM.
The Court's Analysis Versus The Guidelines
Both the analysis of the court of claims and the analysis under the
proposed guidelines lead to the conclusion that copyright protection
99. See note 87 supra.
100. Henry, Copyright, Public Policy, and Information Technology, 183 SCIENcE
384, 389 (1974).
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should be denied. Insofar as it maintains the status quo during the
period before Congress enacts a solution, such a conclusion seems rea-
sonable. 01
It is hazardous to predict what the United States Supreme Court
will do with Williams & Wilkins Co. v. United States on the basis of
cases such as Goldstein, Fortnightly, and Teleprompter, because of the
difference in the nature of the interests at stake and the methods of
analysis used. The courts have seemingly extended or refused copy-
right protection by noting which party is more "deserving." The re-
cording pirates in Goldstein seemed particularly undeserving of the op-
portunity to use another's work without compensation to the original
author. If copyright protection had not been granted in that case, the
pirates would have been able to acquire a major share of the possible
profits without sharing in the original costs of production. In contrast,
the Fortnightly and Teleprompter copyright holders failed to generate
much sympathy, because television advertisers, and not television view-
ers, are the source of funds from which copyright holders are paid.
The copyright holders possibly could have negotiated a greater fee to
be paid by the advertisers, based on the number of viewers added to
the broadcast market by CATV. Therefore the Court does not extend
copyright protection. The Williams & Wilkins Company also fails to
generate sympathy, because it profits from work largely supported by
government funds,102 and because any damage to the plaintiff publisher
will progressively become de minimis with the passage of time. The
United States Supreme Court therefore might conclude that copyright
protection should be denied, the same result reached under the analysis
of the Court of Claims and the guidelines.
It is worthwhile re-emphasizing that the allocation of the burden
of proof in Williams & Wilkins Company v. United States controls the
outcome of the case to a considerable extent. The Court of Claims
puts the burden of proof on the plaintiff publisher to show that photo-
copying in the context of NIH and NLM is not a fair use. Nimmer
strongly criticizes the court, on the ground that a plaintiff does not have
to prove actual damages in order to make out a case for infringement,
and failure to do so in the usual case merely gives rise to the minimum
101. See note 106 infra.
102. "In addition to the fact that government funds substantially support medical
research projects that produce the articles to be published, it should be noted that medi-
cal researchers often become aware of the need to obtain an article by use of the IrNDx
MEnicus, a medical periodical bibliography service compiled by NLM. The INDEX MED-
icus is a sufficiently important means of 'advertising' and attracting subscribers that
Williams & Wilkins Company agreed to await the final decision of the United States
Supreme Court before instituting a licensing system, after a threat by NLM to retaliate
by not listing Williams & Wilkinson journals in the INmEx MEDrcus." Hearings, supra
note 88, at 157-59.
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statutory damages liability.1 3 The guidelines agree that the burden
of proof should be on the defendant concerning damages; however,
they direct the focus to the amount of injury to progress in science and
the arts, rather than the amount of economic injury per se sustained
by a given plaintiff as a result of denial of copyright. To a considerable
extent, the same factors are considered under the proposed guidelines
and the amorphous doctrine of fair use. The guideline approach is at-
tractive in that it provides a constitutional basis for the allocation of a
positive burden of proof between the plaintiff and defendant.
Conclusions and Recommendations
There are important interests at stake in copyright law, including
the rights of authors and composers, the economic and business rela-
tions of publishers, patterns of information usage and dissemination,
and ,the future progress of science and the arts. It seems inevitable
that there will continue to be technological advances as there have been
in the past. It is therefore desirable for legislators and judges to study
carefully how copyright law should be applied to developments unantic-
ipated when the law is written.
It has been the principal thesis of this note that rules are needed
to guide courts applying copyright law to new situations, that such
guidelines would give consistency and predictability from decision -to
decision in the method of analysis used and the allocation and nature
of the burden of proof, enabling creators and users of copyrighted ma-
terials to make reasonable plans accordingly, and that the language of
the Copyright Clause implies certain standards -to guide courts in apply-
ing copyright law to new technological developments. It is therefore
recommended that the law be revised to provide guidelines for
courts applying it to future developments unanticipated today, and that,
until Congress makes an express provision on the subject, judges con-
fronted with a new development should structure their analyses to con-
form with the standards suggested by the copyright clause: (1) the
primary obligation of a court should be to arrive at a decision that
furthers the goal of copyright law, namely, the promotion of progress
in science and the arts; (2) a court should require the copyright holder
to establish a prima facie case that the defendant is an infringer; (3)
when a copyright holder has shown his ownership and the defendant's
unlicensed copying, the defendant should then be held liable unless he
can show that progress in science and the arts would be curtailed by
copyright protection.
103. 1 NiMMER, supra note 15, at § 145. See also MacmilUan Co. v. King, 223
F. 862 (D. Mass. 1914).
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Postcript
Senate Bill 1361 is the product of twenty years of deliberation by
Congress concerning complete revision of copyright law.'04 Several
provisions are worthy of notice, either because they indicate the reac-
tion of the Senate to past judicial resolution of unanticipated develop-
ments or because -they set forth legislative solutions that will modify
future judicial analysis. Thus, there are sections that provide in detail
for the three unanticipated developments that have been reviewed in
this note, namely, sound recordings (section 114),1°5 CATV (section
111),106 and reproduction by libraries (section 108).107
Section 301 provides that all state laws concerned with copyright
are to be preempted.10 8  Such legislation by Congress is of interest in
104. See note 4 supra.
105. "(a) The exclusive rights of the owner of copyright in a sound recording to
reproduce and perform it are limited to the rights to duplicate the sound recording in
the form of phonorecords or copies of audiovisual works that directly or indirectly recap-
ture the actual sounds fixed in the recording, and to perform those actual sounds." S.
1361, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. § 114 (1974).
106. "[S]econdary transmission to the public by a cable system of a primary trans-
mission made by a broadcast station licensed by the Federal Communications Commis-
sion and embodying a performance or display of a work shall be subject to compulsory
licensing. . . ." S. 1361, 93d Cong., 2 Sess. § 111(c)(1) (1974). "L]he secondary
transmission to the public by a cable system of a primary transmission made by a broad-
cast station licensed by the Federal Communications Commission and embodying a per-
formance or display of a work is actionable as an act of infringement..... S. 1361,
93d Cong., 2d Sess., § 111(c)(2) (1974).
107. "Milt is not an infringement of copyright for a library or archives . . . to re-
produce no more than one copy or phonorecord of a work, or distribute such copy or
phonorecord, under the conditions specified by this section and if:
(1) The reproduction or distribution is made without any purpose of direct or indirect
commercial advantage; and
(2) The collections of the library or archives are (i) open to the public, or (ii) avail-
able not only to researchers affiliated with the library or archives or with the institution
of which it is a part, but also to other persons doing research in a specialized field,
(3) The reproduction or distribution of the work includes a notice of copyright." S.
1361, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., § 108(a) (1974).
108. "(a) On and after January 1, 1975, all rights in the nature of copyright...
whether published or unpublished, are governed exclusively by this title. Thereafter, no
person is entitled to copyright, literary property rights, or any equivalent legal or equita-
ble right in any such work under the common law or statutes of any State.
(b) Nothing in this title annuls or limits any rights or remedies under the common
law or statutes of any State with respect to:
(1) unpublishedmaterial... ;
(2) any cause of action arising from undertakings commenced before January 1,
1975;
(3) activities violating rights that are not equivalent to any of the exclusive rights
within the general scope of copyright ... " S. 1361, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. § 301
(1974).
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relation to Goldstein because it would nullify the effect of the pro-
nouncement in Goldstein:
The clause of the Constitution granting to Congress the power to
issue copyrights does not provide that such power shall vest exclu-
sively in the Federal Government. Nor does the Constitution ex-
pressly provide that such power shall not be exercised by the
States.109
If section 301 becomes law and the Court is confronted again with a
situation similar to Goldstein, it is likely that the Court would empha-
size that it was dealing with the bare Constitution in Goldstein without
direct word from Congress, and that Congress can exercise its granted
power to create laws of national scope preempting state action in the
area of copyright." 0
Section 111(a)(1) suggests legislative dissatisfaction with the ju-
dicial solution in Buck v. Jewell-LaSalle Realty,"' because where the
Court held the hotel liable, the section indicates -that secondary trans-
mission by a hotel of a primary transmission is not an infringement of
copyright.1 2
In contrast to the decision of the Court in Fortnightly and Tele-
prompter, seotion 111(c) indicates the Senate's conclusion that the
public interest would be best served if every CATV system makes some
copyright payment. L3 Similarly, to the extent that section 108 reflects
the current state of mind, it would appear that the Senate agrees that
the public interest would be best served if libraries are allowed to make
a single photocopy of an article without having to pay a fee to the copy-
right holder, so long as the reproduction is for a noncommercial use." 4
Section 107 gives statutory basis for "fair use,"", and attempts to
109. Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546, 553 (1972).
110. Id. at 571.
111. 283 U.S. 191 (1931).
112. "The secondary transmission of a primary transmission embodying a perform-
ance or display of a work is not an infringement of copyright if:
(1) the secondary transmission is not made by a cable system, and consists en-
tirely of the relaying, by the management of a hotel, apartmnt house, or similar
establishment, of signals transmitted by a broadcast station licensed by the Federal
Communications Commission, within the local service area of such station, to the
private lodgings of guests or residents of such establishment, and no direct charge
is made to see or hear the secondary transmission. . . ." S. 1361, 93d Cong., 2d
Sess. § 111(a)(1) (1974).
113. See note 107 supra. "Every cable system should make some copyright pay-
ment." S. REP. No. 983, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 133 (1974).
114. See note 107 supra.
115. "mhe fair use of a copyrighted work, including such use by reproduction in
copies or phonorecords or by any other means specified by that section, for purposes
such as criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching, scholarship, or research, is not an
infringement of copyright. In determining whether the use made of a work in any par-
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set forth the factors presently considered in determining whether the
use made of a work in any particular case is fair.1 ' Substantially the
same issues are considered under section 107 and under the proposed
guidelines, but -the section does not give guidance on the assignment
of the burden of proof. The history of Williams & Wilkins Company
v. United States'17 suggests that it would be desirable to amend section
107 to clarify how the burden of proof should be allocated between
plaintiff and defendant.
Particularly commendable is Title If of S. 1361, which creates a
Commission on New Technological Uses of Copyrighted Works to
study and make recommendations on new copyright problems such as
those raised by computers and other information storage and retrieval
systems." 8  However, the Commission's charter terminates after three
years. Unless -the Commission suggests to Congress a set of workable
rules to guide courts dealing with unanticipated situations and Congress
enacts those rules, copyright law will continue to be inadequate in the
future. It would therefore appear prudent to revise S. 1361 now in
order to incorporate the standards suggested by the copyright clause
and provide guidelines for courts applying copyright law to future de-
velopments unanticipated today.
ticular case is a fair use the factors to be considered shall include:
(1) the purpose and character of the use;
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work;
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copy-
righted work as a whole; and
(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted
work. S. 1361, 93d Cong., 2dSess. § 107 (1974).
116. See S. REP. No. 946, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 116 (1974).
117. 172 U.S.P.Q. 670 (Ct. Cl. 1972), rev'd, 487 F.2d 1345 (Ct. Cl. 1973), cert.
granted, 417 U.S. 907 (1974).
118. "(a) There is hereby created in the Library of Congress a National Commis-
sion on New Technological Uses of Copyrighted Works (hereafter called the Commis-
sion).
(b) The purpose of the Commission is to study and compile data on:
(1) the reproduction and use of copyrighted works of authorship-
(A) in conjunction with automatic systems capable of storing, processing, re-
trieving, and transferring information; and
(B) by various forms of machine reproduction, not including reproduction by
or at the request of instructors for use in face-to-face teaching activities; and
(2) the creation of new works by the application or intervention of such auto-
matic systems or machine reproduction.
(c) The Commission shall make recommendations as to such changes in copyright law
or procedures that may be necessary to assure for such purposes access to copyrighted
works, and to provide recognition of the rights of copyright owners." S. 1361, 93d
Cong., 2d Sess. § 201 (1974).
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